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Abstract: Workers are embedded within a network of social relationships
and can communicate through word-of-mouth. They can ￿nd a job through
either formal agencies or personal contacts. From this micro scenario, we
derive an aggregate matching function that has the standard properties but
fails to be homogeneous of degree one. Search frictions arise endogenously
because of coordination failures between workers as in the standard urn-ball
model. However, contrary to the latter, the network of personal contacts al-
lows here for a (partial) replacement of redundant jobs. Therefore, introducing
word-of-mouth communication among network-related individuals reduces co-
ordination failures and alleviates the associated search frictions. In particular,
when the network size increases, on average, the unemployed workers hear
about more vacancies through their social network but, at the same time,
it is more likely that multiple vacancies reach the same unemployed worker.
Above a certain critical value, this job overcrowding becomes so important that
job matches decrease with network size. Finally, we show the existence and
uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium and study its properties. In dense
enough networks, the corresponding equilibrium unemployment rate increases
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1with network size.
1 Introduction
Individuals seeking for jobs read newspapers, go to employment agencies,
browse in the web and mobilize their local networks of friends and relatives.
Although underestimated by the bulk of the search and matching literature,
personal contacts often play a prominent role in matching job-seekers with va-
cancies. The empirical evidences indeed suggest that about half of all jobs are
￿lled through contacts.1 Networks of personal contacts mediate employment
opportunities which ￿ow through word-of-mouth and, in many cases, con-
stitute a valid alternative source of employment information to more formal
methods.2
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we endogeneize search frictions
through coordination failures, obtained from an explicit micro scenario for the
matching function in which ￿nding a job depends both on formal and infor-
mal methods. According to this scenario, workers are linked to each other
by a social network, the members of this network can communicate through
word-of-mouth and agents partly rely on friends to gather information about
employment opportunities. Second, we establish a non-monotonic relation-
1Sociologists and labor economists have produced a broad empirical literature on labor
market networks. In fact, the pervasiveness of social networks and their relative eﬀectiveness
varies with the social group considered. For instance, Holzer (1988) shows that among 16-23
years old workers who reported job acceptance, 66% used informal search channels (30%
direct application without referral and 36% friends/relatives), while only 11% use state
agencies and 10% newspapers. See also Corcoran et al. (1980) and Granovetter (1995).
More recently, Topa (2001) argues that the observed spatial distribution of unemployment
in Chicago is consistent with a model of local interactions and information spillovers, and
may thus be generated by agent￿s reliance in informal methods of job search such as networks
of personal contacts.
2Montgomery (1991) emphasizes the role of networks and its advantages for the employer
relative to other channels as providing a screening device against low-ability workers. Indeed,
it is widely documented that individuals tend to interact with individuals like themselves
(a property often called assortative matching or inbreeding bias). Therefore, currently em-
ployed high-ability workers (whose type has already been revealed to the employer) are more
likely to refer workers of the same type. Because of that, employers often delegate to the
network of their current workforce the screening function of ￿nding a suitable employee. Our
focus here is rather on characterizing the (endogenous) returns of job information exchange
in social networks and the associated labor market equilibrium.
2ship between network size and job matches because in larger networks, on
average, unemployed workers hear about more vacancies through their social
network but coordination failures increase. Finally, we fully characterize the
steady-state labor market equilibrium, show its existence and uniqueness, and
investigate the link between the network of personal contacts, the information
transmission protocol and the equilibrium unemployment and vacancy rates.
There have been several attempts to ￿nd a micro foundation of the stan-
dard macroeconomic matching function. The most popular reduced form is
the exponential matching function that was ￿rst employed by Butters (1977)
to model contacts between buyers and sellers in commodity markets.3 More
recently, Lagos (2000) has proposed an alternative micro approach by deriving
an aggregate matching function which takes the form of a min function. Our
micro foundation of the matching function based on word-of-mouth commu-
nication gives insights on the relationship between job search, job matching
and social network. In fact, there have been few theoretical attempts to model
this link. Notable exceptions include Diamond (1981), Montgomery (1991,
1992), Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) and Kugler (2000) that contribute
to the theoretical literature on equilibrium wage determination in search mar-
kets. However, in all these approaches, the modelling of the social network
is quite shallow. To our knowledge, the ￿rst paper to explicitly model the
structure of social contacts by an undirected network in a labor market con-
text is Boorman (1975).4 Following this early contribution, Calv· o-Armengol
(2001) develops a model specifying at the individual level both the decision to
establish or to maintain social ties with other agents, and the process by which
information about jobs is obtained and transmitted. The analysis focuses on
3This matching function owes its origin to the well-known and extensively analysed urn-
ball model in probability theory. According to this model, the labor market is visualized
as ￿urns￿ (vacancies) to be ￿lled by ￿balls￿ (workers). Because of a coordination failure
inherent to any random placing of the balls in the urns, not all pairs are matched exactly.
Rather, this uncoordinated process yields an overcrowding in some jobs and no applications
in others. Such coordination failures are thus the sources of search frictions. In most cases,
the system steady state can be approximated by an exponential-type matching function as
the population becomes large. See for instance Hall (1979), Pissarides (1979), Peters (1991),
Blanchard and Diamond (1994), Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), Smith and Zenou (2001).
4A recent and growing literature stresses the role of networks in explaining a wide range
of economic phenomema among which labor markets are just an example. See for instance
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and Goyal (2000) and the references therein. For a
previous model of word-of-mouth communication, see Ellison and Fudenberg (1995).
3the impact that an endogenous determination of job contact networks has on
the eﬀectiveness of information transmission and on the aggregate unemploy-
ment level. On the contrary, the present paper builds an aggregate matching
function stemming from an explicit network structure, and determines the im-
pact a partial reliance on social networks as a method of job search has on
labor market outcomes.
More precisely, in our model, individuals are not isolated one with respect
to the other. Rather, they are embedded within a network of social relation-
ships. We represent this social network by an undirected graph where nodes
stand for the agents and a link between two nodes means that the correspond-
ing agents can communicate directly. For most of the analysis, we focus on
symmetric social networks where all agents have the same number of direct
acquaintances. We refer to this number as the network size. Given a network
of contacts, information about employment opportunities can be transmitted
between any two direct neighbors through word-of-mouth communication. In
other words, when a job is available in the economy, workers can match with
such a vacancy using either formal or informal methods. When an unemployed
worker hears directly from a vacancy, we assume that s/he takes the job, and
this is considered as a formal method (since the social network plays no role).
If on the contrary the worker hearing directly from a vacancy is currently
employed, we assume that s/he transmits this information to her/his direct
unemployed neighbors. Unemployed workers getting a job with the help of
their local social network −as described above− rely on informal methods of
job search.
Our ￿rst result is to endogenously derive search frictions through coordi-
nation failures between workers. In this respect, our model can be seen as an
extension of the standard urn-ball model mentioned above. However, in our
framework, because of the two sources of ￿nding a job, the network of personal
contacts allows for a (partial) replacement of redundant jobs, thus reducing
coordination failures and alleviating matching frictions, whose intensity is now
explicitly related to network size. From this micro scenario, in which the
structure of personal contacts and the job information transmission process
is spelled out in detail, we obtain a well-de￿ned aggregate matching function
that gives the number of job matches per unit of time. The corresponding
reduced form is expressed in terms of the unemployed worker and vacant ￿rm
pools, and the social network underlying players￿ talks. Contrarily to previous
4contributions which also provide micro foundations of matching functions, the
expression obtained here is neither an exponential nor a min one. This match-
ing function is increasing and strictly concave in both the unemployment and
the vacancy rates. Moreover, the (extension of the standard) matching func-
tion we provide clearly relates job matching to individual social embeddedness
and captures complex spillovers within social networks of interrelated personal
contacts.
Our second result is to show that the relationship between network struc-
ture (namely size) and job ￿nding is not as straightforward as it is commonly
viewed. Indeed, in the standard social network literature (especially in soci-
ology), more contacts are thought to be an advantage because of more net-
work members who can potentially broker job vacancies and job seekers. We
show in fact that this result crucially depends on the size of the network. In-
deed, in a symmetric social network, we demonstrate that, when the network
size increases, on average, the unemployed workers hear about more vacan-
cies through their social network but, at the same time, it is more likely that
multiple vacancies reach the same unemployed worker, thus increasing coor-
dination failures. Therefore, there exists a critical network size, above which
coordination failures are so important that the individual job-acquisition rate
decreases. As a result, there is a non-monotonic relationship between network
size and the rate at which matches occur so that the matching function fails
to be homogenous of degree one.
Our last result is, using this matching function, to fully characterize the
steady-state labor market equilibrium whose existence and uniqueness are es-
tablished. We show that the resulting equilibrium unemployment rate de-
creases with the network size in sparse networks while it increases when the
pattern of links is dense.
The remaining of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the
social network, the labor market and the information transmission protocol
within this network. Section 3 derives the aggregate matching function and
examines its main properties. The characterization, the existence and the
uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium is established in section 4. Section
5 concludes and all the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
52 Social Network and Word-of-Mouth Com-
munication
Social networks are links and associations between people of a common ilk.
These can be friends, acquaintances and colleagues. Networks are evident
between family members, but are also established between friends and neigh-
borhood residents. In this section, we model the social network between people
by means of graph theory.
2.1 The social network
We consider a ￿nite population of workers N = {1,...,n}. In our model,
individuals are not isolated one with respect to the other. Rather, they are
embedded within a network of social relationships. More precisely, each worker
i is in direct contact with a group of workers (her/his set of friends or relatives)
and we assume that each pair of directly connected workers can communicate
with each other through word-of-mouth. A direct link between two individuals
i and j is denoted by ij. The collection of all existing links constitutes the
prevailing social network of personal relationships denoted by g. Such a social
network is modelled as an undirected graph in which binary relationships are
symmetric that is, whenever i is connected to j according to g (ij ∈ g), then
j is also connected to i according to g (ji ∈ g).
Given a social network g,w ed e n o t eb yNi(g) the set of all direct neighbors
of worker i. Formally, Ni(g)={j ∈ N\{i} : ij ∈ g}.W ea l s od e n o t eb yni(g)
the cardinal of the set Ni(g) that is, the number of direct neighbors of i with
whom s/he can directly communicate. For example, Figure 1a corresponds to
a star-shaped graph in which worker 1 can communicate with every other in-
dividual in the economy whereas workers 2 to n = 6 can directly communicate
only with worker 1. Figure 1b illustrates the case of the complete graph where
every worker can directly communicate with everybody.
An interesting case to be considered is when all workers have the same
number of direct neighbors that is, ni(g)=s for all i ∈ N. Such a graph is
called a symmetric graph and s is the size of the corresponding social network.
The complete graph described in Figure 1b is a particular case of a symmetric
network where s = n − 1=5 .
[Insert Figures 1aa n d1bh e r e ]
62.2 The labor market
The labor market environment is as follows. Time is discrete and continues
forever. At any point in time, each of the n w o r k e r si se i t h e re m p l o y e do r
unemployed. At period t, the unemployment pool is denoted by Ut and the
corresponding unemployment rate by ut = Ut/n.T h e r ea r ea l s oVt vacancies to
be￿lled and each worker directly hears of a vacancy with probability vt = Vt/n.
We refer to vt as the job arrival rate or the vacancy rate. Each employer posts a
vacancy by advertising this job both in employment agencies (and/or national
newspapers) and to her/his current workers.
At each period, currently employed workers lose their jobs with some prob-
ability δ. This process is taken to depend only on the general state of the
economy and hence is treated as exogenous to the labor market. The tim-
ing of the model is as follows. At the end of period t, the unemployment
and employment rates are respectively equal to ut and 1 − ut. At the begin-
ning of period t + 1, there is a technological shock and employed workers lose
their jobs with the breakdown probability δ. The resulting employment rate is
(1−δ)(1−ut). Then, Vt+1 vacancies are posted and jobs are ￿lled according to
the procedure described below. At the end of period t+1, the unemployment
and employment rates are respectively equal to ut+1 and 1−ut+1.A n ds oo n .
From now on, and for notational simplicity, we omit the subscript t when no
confusion is possible.
2.3 Word-of-mouth information transmission
At each period, and once the technological shock has occurred, any worker
(employed or unemployed) directly hears of a vacant job with probability v =
V/n. Recall that jobs are systematically posted both through employment
agencies (or newspapers) and within ￿rms. Hence, the probability that a
worker directly hears of a job (i.e. through the employment agency for the
unemployed or from the employer her/himself for the employed) is always equal
to v irrespective of the current employment status. There are now two cases
to be considered. First, the directly informed worker is unemployed. Then,
s/he takes this job immediately. This means that this worker has found the job
through an employment agency (or an ad in the newspapers) and, consequently,
does not rely on her/his social network to be reemployed. Second, the directly
informed worker is employed, meaning that s/he has been directly informed
7by her/his current employer. Obviously, this worker does not need this job
and transmits this information to one of her/his direct unemployed neighbors,
if any. We assume that unemployed workers are treated on an equal footing,
which means that all unemployed direct neighbors have the same probability
to be informed.5
Observe that, according to this information transmission protocol, job in-
formation can only ￿ow through word-of-mouth from an employed to an un-
employed worker that is, between workers with diﬀerent employment status.
Indeed, vacancies are assumed to be posted for one period which coincides
with the time required to transmit information to direct neighbors. Therefore,
if the informed worker is both employed and does not have any unemployed
worker in her/his direct vicinity, the job slot is lost. Similarly, if an unem-
ployed worker hears of two (or more) vacancies through word-of-mouth from
two (or more) direct employed neighbors, we assume that s/he selects one job
randomly, the other job(s) being lost. Finally, one (or more) job(s) is (are)
also lost when an unemployed worker hears of jobs both directly and through
friends.
Assuming that job information cannot be relayed further away than the di-
rect neighborhood of the initially informed employed worker is not completely
at odds with empirical ￿ndings. Indeed, Granovetter (1995) shows that infor-
mation transmission with no relay (as assumed here) accounts for 39.1% of the
jobs found through contacts (p. 57). To keep things tractable, we maintain
this simplifying assumption throughout and, in section 2.5, we discuss how our
results are robust to generalizations of this information transmission protocol.
5There are two equivalent interpretations of this assumption. Either the employed worker
transmits the information about a vacancy to only one worker that s/he picks at random
among all her/his neighbors or the employed worker transmits this information to all her/his
unemployed neighbors. In both cases, the probability to hear about the vacancy for an un-
employed worker belonging to the network of this employed worker is exactly the same. The
two interpretations are thus formally equivalent. A more realistic model should also allow
for job information exchange among unemployed workers with a common employed friend,
whenever they are directly linked with each other. As we shall see, such generalizations
jeopardize the model tractability without adding further insights.
82.4 Finding a job through personal contacts
In our model, workers partly rely on friends to gather information about poten-
tial jobs. Denote by θ ≡ (1−δ)(1−u) the individual probability of remaining
employed after the technological shock and before vacancies are posted for the
current period. Conditional on being unemployed and not hearing directly of a
vacancy, the individual probability of ￿nding a job through contacts for worker







(1 − θ)nj (g)
#
(1)
The explanation for this result is the following. Fix a worker j ∈ Ni (g)
in the direct neighborhood of player i.T h e n , vθ is the probability of this
particular neighbor j knowing of a job opportunity (probability v) and not
needing it (probability θ). This employed and informed neighbor j transmits
this available job information to her/his direct neighbor i with probability
1−θ
nj(g)
(1−θ)nj(g). Indeed, the probability of i being the unemployed worker selected
among all the unemployed neighbors of j to be told about the existing vacancy
can be decomposed as follows:
1 − θ
nj(g)














According to this expression, worker i is the recipient of the job informa-
tion held by her/his employed neighbor j if either s/he the only unemployed
neighbor of j (probability θ
nj(g)−1)o rs / h ei st h eo n es e l e c t e da m o n gt h e
k + 1 unemployed friends of j (probability 1
k+1θ
nj(g)−k−1(1 − θ)k). Therefore,
vθ 1−θ
nj(g)
(1−θ)nj(g) is the probability of player i ￿nding a job thanks to his direct
neighbor j ∈ Ni(g), whereas with complementary probability 1 − vθ 1−θ
nj(g)
(1−θ)nj(g)








denotes the individual probability of worker i
not hearing of a vacancy through word-of-mouth communication from any of
her/his direct acquaintances.
In Figures 1a and 1b, we have calculated this probability Pi(g,u,v)f o ra
star-shaped graph and a complete graph. From Figure 1a, it is clear that indi-
vidual 1 has the highest probability to ￿nd a job through word-of-mouth since
s/he is connected to everybody whereas all the others have the same probability
9since they are only connected to individual 1 (P1 >P 2 = P3 = P4 = P5 = P6).
In Figure 1b, all individuals have the same number of direct neighbors (sym-
metric graph), which implies that they all have the same probability to ￿nd a
job through contacts (P1 = P2 = P3 = P4 = P5 = P6). Observe however that,
in both cases, all individuals have the same probability v to ￿nd a job through
formal methods since this job-￿nding process does not depend on the social
network.
From now on, we focus on symmetric social networks with uniform mix in
which all workers have both the same number of neighbors equal to s (symme-
try) and the same number of employed and unemployed direct contacts equal
respectively to (1 − u)s and us (uniform mix). We refer to s as the network
size. In a symmetric network of size s, the individual probability of hearing of









As stated above, Figure 1b depicts a particular example of a symmetric
social network when s = n − 1=5 .
Proposition 1 The properties of P(s,u,v) are the following:
(i) P(•,u,v) is increasing between 0 and s and decreasing between s and
n−1,w h e r es is the unique global maximum of P(•,u,v).A l s o ,P(•,u,v)
is strictly concave on [0,K) for some K>s;
(ii) P(s,•,v) is decreasing in u. Moreover, there exists some e δ ∈ [0,1) such
that P (s,•,v) is strictly convex in u when δ ≥ e δ;
(iii) P(s,u,•) is increasing and strictly concave in v.
Let us ￿rst comment the ￿r s tr e s u l t( i) of Proposition 1. If we ￿x u
and v,t h e n( i) shows that the individual probability P(•,u,v)t o￿nd a job
through word-of-mouth within the network of social contacts exhibits dimin-
ishing marginal returns to network size s.6 In other words, the marginal impact
6In fact, this is true only on a restricted domain [0,K) including the unique global
maximum s. However, observe that concavity holds on the whole domain where s is allowed
to vary whenever K ≥ n − 1.
10of adding a new connection to everybody decreases with the total number of
pairwise links in the society. Moreover, P(•,u,v) increases with s in sparse
networks (s<s) while it decreases with s in densely connected labor market
networks (s>s).
To understand this result, observe that increasing the network size has
both a (positive) direct and (negative) indirect eﬀect. On one hand, rising the
network size expands the available direct connections to every worker. Work-
ers become better connected and, consequently, the potential job information
they can bene￿t from increases. On the other hand, rising the network size also
increases the potential number of unemployed workers directly connected to
an employed and informed worker. The information held by every employed
worker is now shared by a larger group of unemployed workers. Therefore,
every unemployed worker suﬀers from the information sharing constraints ex-
erted by the unemployed indirectly connected to her/him. Stated diﬀerently,
expanding one￿s neighborhood has a negative impact on the current direct
friends as it reduces their (individual) probability to gather job opportuni-
ties through social contacts. Workers relative locations thus create a negative
network externality for their direct vicinity.
Another way to understand Proposition 1 (which will be very useful when
we derive the matching function) is to highlight the coordination failures in
the search process. Take a given unemployed individual in a network of size
s and let τ (s)=vθ(1 − θ
s)/(1 − θ). Any direct contact passes informa-
tion on to the unemployed worker with probability τ (s)/s. Indeed, a direct
contact passes on job information to some particular unemployed friend of
her/him whenever: this direct contact remains employed after job separations,
which happens with probability θ; this direct contact is informed about a job
vacancy, which happens with probability v; and our unemployed worker is se-
lected as the recipient of this job information, which happens with probability
(1 − θ
s)/s(1 − θ). Since the unemployed worker in question has s diﬀerent di-
rect contacts, then ￿nding a job through word-of-mouth communication corre-
sponds to a random experiment consisting of s repeated independent Bernoulli
trials with a probability of success at each individual trial given by τ (s)/s.
The number of job oﬀers an unemployed worker hears about through his net-
work thus follows a binomial distribution of parameters B (τ (s)/s;s).
Let X be a random variable that represents the number of successes in the
s repeated independent Bernoulli trials that is, the number of job vacancies
11passed on through word-of-mouth communication. X follows the binomial
distribution B (τ (s)/s;s). Therefore, the total expected number E[X] of job





It is easy to see that E[X] increases with s, is concave and converges to
vθ/(1 − θ)a ss → +∞. In other words, in larger networks, the unemployed
workers hear about more jobs on average. Also, when the network becomes
large, the average number of vacancies communicated through this network
becomes vθ/(1 − θ)=v/(1 − θ) − v. Since the unemployment rate after job
separations but before matches equals 1−θ, this total expected number of va-
cancies an unemployed hears about is simply the vacancy rate divided by the
unemployment rate (after separations, before matches), excluding those va-
cancies the unemployed person hears about directly (with a probability equal
to the vacancy rate).
However, as network size s increases, the support of the binomial distribu-
tion B (τ(s)/s,s) also widens. This has a subtle countervailing eﬀect. Indeed,
the probability that an unemployed worker has at least one job oﬀer is:7






It is straightforward to see that, holding τ(s)/s constant, this probability (of
hearing about multiple vacancies) increases when the support s of the binomial
distribution widens. This highlights the coordination failures of our model.
When the network size s increases, on average, the unemployed workers hear
about more vacancies through their social network but, at the same time, it
is more likely that multiple vacancies reach the same unemployed worker. We
show in fact that there is a critical network size s8 above which the second
eﬀect dominates the ￿rst one.
In sparse networks, the individual probability to ￿nd a job through word-
of-mouth increases with the network size and workers￿ connections alleviate
coordination failures (with respect to the canonical urn-ball model) by allowing
a partial replacement or job matches. In dense networks, though, coordination
7Of course, Pr[X ≥ 1] = P(s,u,v).
8The threshold value s is uniquely determined by
∂P(s,u,v)
∂s =0 .
12failures arise again and more connections now harm the matching process by
(slightly) slowing down information exchange.
The second (ii) and third result (iii) of Proposition 1 are now quite easy
to understand. When the unemployment rate u increases, two eﬀects are in
order: the likelihood that a worker, who is directly informed of a vacancy
through formal channels (arrival rate v), is unemployed increases; and also
the number of unemployed directly connected to every informed and employed
worker rises (more coordination failures). This implies that u and P(s,•,v)
are negatively correlated. To understand the positive impact of the vacancy
rate v on the individual probability of ￿nding a job through friends P(s,u,•)
a similar intuition applies.
2.5 Generalizing the communication protocol
So far, we have assumed that information about job opportunities can only
￿ow from employed workers to unemployed direct acquaintances. In particular,
the informed worker cannot transmit any information to any other employed
friend that may then relay it to some unemployed direct contact, if any. Hence,
the rate at which employed workers hear of a job opportunity is completely
determined by the vacancy rate v and does not depend on the network of social
contacts g. As a consequence, one￿s indirect neighbors do not constitute a po-
tential source of job information. Rather, they are perceived as potential com-
petitive information recipients. The resulting information sharing constraints
they exert on indirect neighbors generate the negative externality arising in
information transmission.
Suppose now that we relax this assumption and we allow for information to
be relayed through word-of-mouth from employed worker to employed worker,
with no restrictions whatsoever on the length of transmission. Assume, though,
that relayed information is correctly transmitted with some probability strictly
less than one, to account, for instance, for forgetfulness.9 Now, the rate aj at
which some employed worker j acquires job information depends both on the
vacancy rate va n do nt h en e t w o r ko fc o n t a c t sg a n dt h u sc a nb ew r i t t e na s
aj (v,g). The individual probability of ￿nding a job through contacts then
9Equivalently, we could assume that there is no forgetfulness at all but that the length





1 − aj (v,g)θ
1 − θ
nj(g)
(1 − θ)nj (g)
#
Indeed, indirect connections do not only induce information sharing constraints
but may now also constitute a valuable source of job information. Still, one can
show that in dense enough networks, the negative eﬀect of information sharing
constraints outweighs the positive impact of possibly acceding a broader range
of information channels. In other words, allowing for information to ￿ow on
the network of contacts along any path connecting two workers does not alter
the qualitative relationship between job matching and social embeddedness
stressed in this paper.10
3 The matching function
As stated above, unemployed workers ￿nd jobs from two diﬀerent channels.
Either they ￿nd their job directly through formal methods −such as adver-
tisement or employment agencies− with probability v, or they gather informa-
tion about jobs through informal methods −in our case, the network of social
contacts− with probability P(s,u,v). In this context, the job acquisition rate
or individual hiring probability of an unemployed worker is:
h(s,u,v)=v +( 1− v)P(s,u,v)( 3 )
At each period of time, there are nu = U unemployed workers that ￿nd
a job with probability h(s,u,v). Since this probability is independent across
diﬀerent individuals, the number of job matches taking place per unit of time
is just nuh(s,u,v). Therefore, the matching function for our labor market
where workers partly rely on personal contacts to ￿nd a job is given by:11,12
m(s,u,v)=u[v +( 1− v)P(s,u,v)] (4)
10For more details on this issue, see Calv· o-Armengol (2001). Note, however, that allow-
ing for information to ￿ow through word-of-mouth with no restrictions on the length of
transmission complicates sharply the analysis. Indeed, when relays are permitted, the local
topology of the network may play a role and has to be taken explicitly into account.
11To be more precise this matching function corresponds to the rate at which job matches
occur per unit of time. It suﬃces therefore to multiply m(s,u,v)b yn to get the number of
matches per unit of time.
12It is easy to verify that the matching function for a general social network g, not neces-
14We can thus express the aggregate rate at which job matches occur as a
function of the unemployed worker and vacant ￿rm pools, and the social net-
work underlying players talks. This endogenous matching function is derived
from an explicit micro scenario where the structure of personal contacts and
the job information transmission process is spelled out in detail. Contrary
to previous contributions also providing micro foundations for matching func-
tions, the well-de￿ned reduced function obtained here is neither an exponential
nor a min one. Moreover, the central role of the network of contacts in match-
ing job-seekers with vacancies is made explicit, and the link between m(s,u,v)
and the network size s is precisely the key element of our model.
Proposition 2 The properties of the matching function m(s,u,v) are the fol-
lowing:
(i) m(•,u,v) is increasing between 0 and s and decreasing between s and
n−1,w h e r es is the unique global maximum of P(•,u,v).A l s o ,m(•,u,v)
is strictly concave on [0,K) for some K>s;
(ii) m(s,•,v) is increasing and strictly concave in u on [0,u] for some 0 <
u ≤ 1;
(iii) m(s,u,•) is increasing and strictly concave in v.
The following comments are in order. First, there is a non-monotonic
relationship between the job matching rate and the network size. To explain
this result, let us use the intuition of section 2.4 in which the number of
job oﬀers an unemployed worker hears about through his network follows a
binomial distribution of parameters B (τ (s)/s;s). In this context, when the
network size s increases, on average, the unemployed workers hear about more
vacancies through their social network (i.e. the expected number of oﬀers τ(s)
reaching an unemployed in a network of size s increases) but, at the same
time, it is more likely that multiple vacancies reach the same unemployed
sarily symmetric, is equal to:
m(g,u,v)=nu
"







where Pi(g) is given by (1).
15worker (i.e. holding τ(s)/s constant, the support of the binomial distribution
widens and the probability of hearing about multiple vacancies rises), thus
increasing coordination failures. Therefore, above a critical network size s,
coordination failures become so important that job matches decrease. We have
thus endogeneized search frictions through coordination failures but, contrary
to the standard urn-ball model, the network of personal contacts allows for
a (partial) replacement of redundant jobs, thus reducing coordination failures
and alleviating matching frictions.
Second, it is easily veri￿ed that P (s,u,v) is not homogeneous of degree
one, implying in turn that the matching function m(s,u,v)a l s of a i l st oe x -
hibit constant returns to scale (with respect to u and v). The intuition for this
result is as follows. Suppose ￿r s tt h a tt h en e t w o r ks i z es is ￿xed. Increasing
the vacancy rate from v to λv (where λ > 1) has a positive direct impact on
all workers in the population. By contrast, increasing the unemployment rate
by the same amount (from u to λu) has both a direct and an indirect nega-
tive eﬀect. Indeed, the number of unemployed direct acquaintances increases,
thus reducing the value of such personal contacts as job providers (direct neg-
ative eﬀect). Moreover, the number of unemployed indirect acquaintances also
increases, thus imposing a stronger information sharing constraint (indirect
negative eﬀect). These two combined negative eﬀects outweigh the positive
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1+θ + •••+ θ
s−1
·
whereas increasing u has both a negative linear
impact through θ of the same order and a magnifying negative impact through
the polynomial form
‡
1+θ + •••+ θ
s−1
·
. This result is at odds with the
standard hypothesis of a constant-return-to-scale aggregate matching function
made in the theoretical literature on job matching (Mortensen and Pissarides,
1999 and Pissarides, 2000). It says that, if social networks and word-of-mouth
communications are integrated in the job-search process, then the matching
function is more likely not to be homogeneous of degree one. Besides, there is
a huge body of empirical work to assess whether this property of the matching
function is encountered in real-life labor markets. Even if the results lean
13Simply note that (1 − θ
s)/(1 − θ)=1+θ + •••+ θ
s−1.
16towards constant returns to scale, they are very much controversial14 and most
of these empirical studies do not include informal methods in ￿nding a job.
By taking into account these methods, it would be interesting to see if the
results would be altered in such a way that the matching function would fail
to exhibit constant returns to scale.
Third, even though our matching function is quite diﬀerent to the ones
found in the literature, it has the same natural properties: it is increasing and
strictly concave in both u and v.15
Finally, we can deduce from (4) the following simple expression for the















Clearly, the properties of both the job-hiring rate h(s,u,v)a n dt h ej o b -
￿lling rate f(s,u,v) as functions of the network size s are immediately deduced
from that of P(s,u,v) namely, strictly concave in s,i n c r e a s i n gb e t w e e n0a n d
s and decreasing between s and n−1. Moreover, the job-hiring rate h(s,u,v)
is decreasing in u and increasing in v whereas the job-￿lling rate f(s,u,v)i s
increasing in u and decreasing in v.16 In other words, given a vacancy rate
v (and a network size s), when the number of unemployed increases, it is
more diﬃcult to ￿nd a job but easier to ￿ll a vacancy. Similarly, given an
unemployment rate u (and a network size s), it becomes easier to ￿nd a job
but more diﬃcult to ￿ll a vacancy as the number of vacancies increases.17
4 The labor market equilibrium
4.1 Characterization of the equilibrium
Firms and workers are all identical. A ￿rm is a unit of production that can
either be ￿lled by a worker whose production is y units of output or be un-
￿lled and thus unproductive. We denote by γ the search cost for the ￿rm per
14See for instance Coles and Smith (1996), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and the
references therein.
15For u, this is true only on a restricted domain, i.e. on [0,u], where u is quite large.
16See Lemmata 1 and 2 in the appendix.
17See Pissarides (2000) for a thorough account and description of such trading external-
ities. Note also that 1/h and 1/f can be interpreted as the mean duration respectively of
unemployment and of vacancies.
17unit of time, by w t h ew a g ep a i db yt h e￿rms when a match is realized and
by r the discount factor. We assume that the wage is exogenous. This is be-
cause our focus is not on wage determination but rather on the communication
mechanisms through which job information is gathered and transmitted, the
network of personal contacts underlying such communication processes, and
their impact on labor market outcomes. In particular, one of the salient fea-
tures of our framework is to derive an explicit matching function from a model
of communication and networks (see Proposition 2).18 In section 4.3, we will
however discuss how our model can take into account endogenous wages.
At every period, matches between workers and ￿rms depend upon the cur-
rent network of social contacts of size s and the current state of the economy
given by the unemployment rate u and the vacancy rate v.W ef o c u so n t h e
steady state equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a network size s and the associated matching technology
m(s,•,•), a (steady-state) labor market equilibrium (u∗(s),v∗(s)) is determined
by a free-entry condition for ﬁrms and a steady-state condition on unemploy-
ment ﬂows.
At the steady state labor market equilibrium, every worker has s direct
acquaintances consisting of su∗ (s) unemployed and s(1 − u∗ (s)) employed
contacts. We now characterize such a steady state equilibrium. We ￿rst estab-
lish the free-entry condition and the resulting labor demand. At period t,t h e
intertemporal pro￿to fa￿lled job and of a vacancy are denoted respectively
by IF,t and IV,t. Recall that the job-￿lling rate f is de￿ned by (5). Since time
is discrete, we have the following standard Bellman equations:
IF,t = y − w +
1
1+r
[(1 − δ)IF,t+1 + δ IV,t+1]
IV,t = −γ +
1
1+r
[(1 − f)IV,t+1 + fI F,t+1]
In steady state, both IF,t = IF,t+1 = IF and IV,t = IV,t+1 = IV.F o l -
lowing Pissarides (2000), we assume that ￿rms post vacancies up to a point
18There are papers that have explored the wage premium associated with the use of
personal contacts in ￿nding a job. See for instance Montgomery (1991) and Kugler (2000)
for analyses of this issue in an adverse selection setting, Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994)
for an equilibrium search models with wage posting and on-the-job search, and Montgomery
(1992) for a model with weak and strong ties.
18where IV = 0. We deduce from this free entry condition the following relation







In other words, the value of a job is equal to the expected search cost, i.e.
the cost per unit of time multiplied by the average duration of search for the
￿rm. This equation can be mapped in the plane (u,v) and is referred to as the
labor demand curve. We then close the model by the following steady-state
condition on ￿ows:
m(s,u,v)=δ(1 − u)( 7 )
As above, this equation can be mapped in the plane (u,v) and is referred
to as the Beveridge curve. The two equations (6) and (7) with two unknowns
u and v fully characterize the labor market equilibrium (u∗(s),v∗(s)) as a
function of the network size s.
Proposition 3 Suppose that γ(r + δ)/(y − w) > δ/(1 + δ).T h e n , f o r a l l
network size s, there exists a labor market equilibrium (u∗(s),v∗(s)).I fγ(r +
δ)/(y − w) is small enough, this equilibrium is unique.
Observe that the condition on the parameters γ(r+δ)/(y−w) > δ/(1+δ)
that guarantees the existence of the equilibrium is very likely to be satis￿ed.
Indeed, we deduce from (6) that γ(r + δ)/(y − w) is equal to the job-￿lling
rate f(s,u,v). A suﬃcient condition for f(s,u,v) > δ/(1 + δ)t oh o l di s
f(s,u,v) > δ that is, the job-￿lling rate be higher than the job-destruction
rate, which is obviously true in most labor markets.
4.2 Social network and unemployment
We now investigate the diﬀerent properties of the labor market equilibrium
and focus on the relationship between the equilibrium unemployment rate
u∗(s)a n dt h es i z eo ft h es o c i a ln e t w o r ks. We assume from now on that the
conditions for uniqueness are met.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium unemployment rate u∗(s) decreases with s
when s<s, while it increases when s ≥ s.
Our matching function depends explicitly on the structure of personal con-
tacts and the labor market equilibrium captures the in￿uence of the frictions
19due to workers social embeddedness on market outcomes. In particular, we
know from propositions 1 and 2 that in a sparse network (s<s) , both the
individual probability P(•,u,v)t o￿nd a job through word-of-mouth and the
matching function increase with the network size s. We deduce from the free
entry condition (6) that, holding the arrival rate v ￿xed, unemployment de-
creases. The Beveridge curve (7) then implies that unemployment must also
decrease to equalize ￿ows out with ￿ows in. Since the two eﬀects have the
same sign, u∗(s) decreases with s. When the social network of contacts is
dense (s ≥ s), the opposite result holds since negative network externalities
prevail in networks of large size and both P(•,u,v)a n dm(•,u,v)d e c r e a s ew i t h
s.
[Insert Figures 2aa n d2bh e r e ]
The impact of the network size s on the equilibrium vacancy rate v∗(s)i s
ambiguous both when the network is sparse (s<s)o rd e n s e( s ≥ s). Indeed,
two opposite eﬀects are now in place. On one hand, increasing the size of
a sparse network improves the transmission of information through word-of-
mouth communication. As a result, matches are more frequent and we deduce
from the free entry condition (6) that more vacancies are posted. In other
words, v∗(s)a n ds are positively correlated. On the other hand, rising the
size of a sparse network by creating additional direct connections increases
the number of matches between workers and ￿rms. We then deduce from the
Beveridge curve (7), that vacancies decrease in order to guarantee that the
￿ows out of unemployment are still equal to the ￿ows into unemployment.
Therefore, v∗(s)a n ds are negatively correlated. When the network is dense,
this ambiguity remains and is sustained by the opposite intuition: v∗(s)a n ds
are both negatively and positively correlated due to (6) and (7) respectively.
4.3 Endogenous wages
So far, we have assumed that wages were exogenous so that employed workers
systematically transmit information about job opportunities to their unem-
ployed friends. One may argue that, if wages were endogenous and negotiated
between workers and ￿rms, the employed could exploit a job oﬀer to increase
their bargaining power and thus their wages. In this case, it would not always
be optimal for employed workers to communicate job oﬀers to their unem-
ployed neighbors. In fact, it is easy to see that currently employed workers
20who had never been oﬀered an outside job would always use any available
outside opportunity to increase their wages. It should be clear that after some
￿nite iterations of such negotiations, these workers would obtain the highest
possible wage.19 This implies that all employed workers who have been work-
ing for a ￿xed number of periods (greater or equal than two) in the same ￿rm
and have exploited all possible wage negotiations, always transmit additional
job information to her/his unemployed friends. Formally, the individual prob-
ability of ￿nding a job through contacts for any unemployed worker within a








where k<1, and the corresponding matching function is given by:
m(s,u,v)=u[v +( 1− v)P(s,u,kv)]
In words, compared to the case of exogenous wages, the unemployed workers
have less chances to hear from a vacancy from their employed direct friends
(kv < v) because the latter can now use job oﬀers to increase their wages.
Observe that k is endogenous and determined by the labor market equilibrium,
and represents the reduction in available job information sources.
In this context, a wage distribution endogenously emerges in equilibrium.
Indeed, apart of the unemployment bene￿t received by the unemployed, em-
ployed workers earn diﬀerent wages depending on their work history (in terms
of outside oﬀers and thus negotiations). The lowest wage is received when they
leave unemployment and start working in a ￿rm whereas in the highest wage
they obtain all the surplus because they have exhausted all possible negotia-
tions. Even if this extension enriches the working of the labor market, it leads
to a much more complicated analysis without altering the qualitative features
of our framework. Indeed, the closed-form expression of our micro-founded
matching function remains similar. More importantly, the frictions induced
by the social network explicitly characterized in terms of information sharing
constraints still hold.
19For instance, if there is Bertrand competition between two employers (the current and
the outside ones), the employed worker who has the two oﬀers obtains all the surplus and
therefore gets straightaway the highest possible wage.
215C o n c l u s i o n
In recent years, a growing literature consisting both of empirical work and
theoretical contributions has stressed the prominence of social networks in
explaining a wide range of economic phenomena. In particular, the prevalent
social contacts strongly determine, or at least in￿uence, economic success of
individuals in a labor market context.
In this paper, we have analyzed the matching between unemployed workers
and vacant jobs in a social network context. More precisely, each individual,
who is embedded within a network of social relationships, can ￿nd a job either
through formal methods (employment agencies or advertisements) or through
informal networks (word-of-mouth communication). From this micro scenario,
we ￿rst derive an aggregate matching function that has the standard prop-
erties but fails to be homogenous of degree one. This is because there is a
non-monotonic relationship between the size of the social network and the
probability to ￿nd a job: increasing the size of sparse networks is bene￿cial
to workers whereas it is detrimental in dense networks. Indeed, increasing the
network size of dense networks slows down word-of-mouth information trans-
mission and creates negative network externalities. We then close the model
by introducing the behavior of ￿rms and show that there exists a unique labor
market equilibrium under mild conditions on the parameters of the economy.
Finally, and because of the previous result, we show that the equilibrium un-
employment rate decreases with the network size in sparse networks while it
increases in dense networks.
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24A Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
Let q (s,θ) ≡
θ(1−θs)
s(1−θ) . Then, P(s,u,v)=1− Q(s,u,v)w h e r eQ(s,u,v)=
[1 − vq(s,θ)]
s. The properties of P (•) can thus be deduced from that of Q(•)
established below:
(a) Q(s,u,•) is decreasing and strictly convex with respect to v.I n d e e d ,




1−vq < 0. Diﬀer-













∂v2 = s(s − 1)Q
q2
(1−vq)2 > 0.
(b) Q(s,•,v) is increasing with respect to u. Moreover, there exists e δ ∈ [0,1)
such that Q(s,•,v) is strictly concave with respect to u as long as
δ ≥ e δ. Indeed, simplifying by (1 − θ)g i v e sq(s,θ)=1
s (θ + •••+ θ
s).
Hence, q(s,•) is increasing with respect to θ, implying that Q(s,u,v)=
[1 − vq(s,1 − u)]
s is increasing with respect to u.F r o mθ =( 1− δ)(1− u)
we deduce that
∂2Q
∂u2 =( 1− δ)
2￿ ∂2
∂θ2 [1 − vq(s,θ)]
s.D i ﬀerentiating twice
gives
∂2
∂θ2 [1 − vq]
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∂2q
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∂u2 |θ=0< 0i se q u i v a l e n tt o2 s>v(s − 1) which is true. Denote by e θ
the smallest positive root of the polynomial R in θ of degree 2(s − 1)
given by: R(θ) ≡ (1 − vq)
∂2q





.I fR(θ) > 0 for all θ > 0
we set e θ =+ ∞ by de￿nition. From R(0) > 0a n db yc o n t i n u i t y ,w e








. Then, R(θ) > 0
on
h




∂u2 < 0 for all u ∈ [0,1] that is, Q(s,•,v)
strictly concave with respect to u,a sl o n ga sδ ≥ e δ.
(c) Q(•,u,v)i sd e c r e a s i n gi n[ 0 ,s] and increasing on [s,+∞). Moreover, is
strictly convex on [0,K)f o rs o m eK>s. We prove this result in four
25steps. Fix u and v and let φ(s)=1 −vq(s,θ). Then, Q(s,u,v)=[ φ(s)]
s
f r o mw h i c hw ed e d u c et h a t
∂Q
∂s = Φ(s)￿Q where Φ(s)=l nφ(s)+s
φ0(s)
φ(s) .




s=1 < 0 which is equivalent to proving















+( 1− vθ)ln(1− vθ).
Establishing that Φ(1) < 0 is thus equivalent to showing that for all






(1 − vθ)ln(1− vθ). Fix θ.D i ﬀerentiating twice gives ρ0
θ (v)=
θ2
1−θ lnθ − θln(1 − vθ)a n dρ00
θ (v)= θ2
1−vθ > 0. Therefore, ρθ is
strictly convex, implying that ρ0
θ increases on (0,1) with supremum
ρ0
θ (1) = θ
1−θ [θlnθ − (1 − θ)ln(1− θ)]. It is straightforward to see
that x 7→ xlnx − (1 − x)ln(1− x) is worth 0 at x =0 , 1
2 and






















supremum given by max{ρθ (0),ρθ (1)}.W e h a v e ρθ (0) = 0 and





+( 1− θ)ln(1− θ). If θ < 1
2, θlnθ <
(1 − θ)ln(1− θ) implying that ρθ (1) < 0. If θ > 1
2, θlnθ >
(1 − θ)ln(1− θ), therefore ρθ (1) < θ
1−θ (1 − θ +l nθ). It is easy to
check that x 7→ 1−x+lnx is negative on (0,1). Hence, ρθ (1) < 0.
In both cases, sup
v∈(0,1)
ρθ = ρθ (0) = 0. Q.E.D.
Step 2. We show that Q(•,u,v) increases towards its asymptotic





when s → +∞, implying that
∂Q
∂s > 0 for high values of s.T h e r e -







Step 3. We show that
∂Q
∂s ≤ 0i m p l i e st h a t
∂2Q












Therefore, Φ0 > 0 implies that
∂2Q
∂s2 . Suppose on the contrary
that Φ0 ≤ 0. We have φ(s)=1− vθ 1−θs






s +l nθ ￿ θ
s
·
→ 0w h e ns → +∞. Therefore, lim
s→+∞ Φ(s)=
0. Hence, Φ0 ≤ 0i m p l i e st h a tΦ > 0. Reciprocally, Φ ≤ 0 implies
that Φ0 > 0, which in turn implies that
∂2Q
∂s2 > 0. But Φ ≤ 0i s
equivalent to
∂Q
∂s ≤ 0. Hence,
∂Q
∂s ≤ 0 implies that
∂2Q
∂s2 > 0.Q.E.D.
26Step 4. We deduce from steps 1 and 2 that
∂Q
∂s =0f o rs o m es ∈




s=s > 0. Therefore, Q(•,u,v)
does not have any local maxima and there exists a unique such
point s,a n dQ(•,u,v) reaches its global minimum at s.M o r e o v e r ,
by continuity of
∂2Q
∂s2 , there exists some K>s such that Q(•,u,v)
is strictly convex on [1,K). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Recall that m(s,u,v)=u[v +( 1− v)P (s,u,v)]. Therefore,
(a) the properties of the matching function m(•,u,v) with respect to s are
deduced from that of P (•,u,v) given in Proposition 1(ii).











∂v + u(1 − v)
∂2P(s,u,v)
∂v2 < 0
proving that m(s,u,•) is increasing and concave with respect to v.





∂u = v +( 1− v) ∂
∂u [uP (s,u,v)]
∂2m(s,u,v)
∂u2 =( 1− v) ∂2
∂u2 [uP (s,u,v)]








2 + •••+ θ
s
·‚s
where θ =( 1 − δ)(1− u). Fix v and s and let R(u) ≡ uP (s,u,v).
Clearly, R(u) is a polynomial in u of degree 2s +1 ,w i t hr o o t s0a n d
1( t h a ti s ,R(0) = R(1) = 0) and strictly positive on (0,1) (that is,
R(u) > 0, ∀0 <u<1). Therefore, R0 (u)=u
∂P(s,u,v)
∂u + P (s,u,v)i sa
polynomial of degree 2s that has a unique root e u ∈ (0,1) corresponding to
the global maximum of R on [0,1]. From R0 (u) continuous and R0 (0) =
P (s,0,v) > 0 we deduce that R0 (u) > 0o n( 0 , e u)a n dt h a tR00(u)
is negative locally around e u that is, R00 (u) < 0o n( e u − ε, e u + ε) for





27Proposition 1(ii)t h a tR00 (0) = 2
∂P(s,u,v)
∂u |u=0< 0. If R00 (u)w e r et o
change sign on [0, e u], by continuity of R00 and because both R00 (0) < 0a n d
R00 (u) < 0, it would imply that R00 (u) had two distinct roots on (0, e u),
which is impossible because successive derivatives of polynomials have
nested roots, and R0 (u) has only one root on [0,1]. Therefore, R00 (u) <
0o n[ 0 , e u]. Let u =a r g m a x {u ∈ [0,1] | R0 > 0a n dR00 < 0o n[ 0 ,u]}.
Clearly, 0 < e u ≤ u ≤ 1.
Lemma 1 The hiring probability h(s,u,v)=
m(s,u,v)
u is decreasing and convex
in u and increasing and concave in v. The properties of h(•,u,v) with respect
to s are the same than that of P (•,u,v).
Proof. Recall that h(s,u,v)=v+(1− v)P (s,u,v). With some algebra and
using Proposition 1 we get:

     
     
∂h(s,u,v)














∂v +( 1− v)
∂2P(s,u,v)
∂v2 < 0
which completes the proof.
Lemma 2 The ﬁlling probability f (s,u,v)=
m(s,u,v)
v is increasing in u and
decreasing in v. The properties of h(•,u,v) with respect to s are the same than
that of P (•,u,v).









. With some algebra















∂v = − u







which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Fix the network size s.W e￿rst prove that along the Beveridge curve, u is
decreasing in v. Indeed, let (u,v)a n d( u0,v0) both satisfying (7) with v0 >v .
By de￿nition, m(s,u,v)=δ (1 − u)a n dm(s,u0,v0)=δ (1 − u0). Suppose
28that u0 ≥ u. Then, m(s,u0,v 0) ≤ m(s,u,v). But we deduce from Proposition
2t h a tm(s,u,v) <m(s,u,v0) ≤ m(s,u0,v0) which yields to a contradiction.
Therefore, u0 <u . We now prove that along the curve in the plane (u,v)
obtained from the free entry condition (6), u is increasing in v. Indeed, from






> 0 according to Lemma
2. If a labor market equilibrium exists on [0,u] ￿ [0,1] ⊆ [0,1]
2,i ti st h u s











satis￿es the free entry condition (which requires that γ r+δ
y−w ≤ 1). A necessary




y−w ≤ u, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose ￿rst that s<s.L e t( u,v) on the Beveridge Curve, thus satisfying
(7), and let s0 such that s<s 0 < s. We know from Proposition 2 that
m(s,u,•) increases with v and that m(s0,u,v) >m(s,u,v). Therefore, if we
keep u constant while increasing the network size from s to s0, the vacancy
rate adjusts by decreasing. As a result, the Beveridge Curve (that decreases
on the plane (u,v)) shifts downwards. Let now (u,v) satisfy (6). We know
f r o mL e m m a2t h a tf (s,u,v)=
m(s,u,v)
v is an decreasing function of v and that
f (s0,u,v) >f(s,u,v). Therefore, the vacancy rate adjusts by increasing and
the curve associated to the free entry condition shifts upwards on the plane
(u,v). One can check geometrically that u∗ (s0) <u ∗ (s). Suppose now that
s ≥ s and let s0 >s . Following a similar reasoning it is straightforward to see
that the Beveridge Curve now shifts upwards while the free entre condition
curve shifts downwards, implying that u∗ (s0) >u ∗ (s).
29P1 = 1 - [1-vθ ]5
P2 = ... = P6 = vθ (1 - θ 5)/5(1 - θ )
Figure 1a. Star centered on 1 (n = 6).
1
23456
P1 = ... = P6 = 1 - [1 - vθ (1 - θ 5)/5(1 - θ )]5





Figure 1: Two Examples of Networks
30Figure 2a. Sparse network (s < s). Figure 2b. Dense network (s > s).
v
u u*(s) u*(s+∆ s)
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Unemployment Level
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